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WORLD MONETARY CENTRES AT THE STAGE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL  
INSTABILITY: RISKS, CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 
                                                             
The paper analyzes origins, challenges and risks, associated with global financial trans-
formations and the aggravation of the national currencies competition, in order to improve the 
understanding of the changes, taking place in this sphere, and to determine prospects for the 
development of the world financial system. It is substantiated that, taking into account the ac-
tions of global fundamental factors (populational, civilizational, technological, allocative and 
financial) in the long term, the financial situation on the planet will remain unstable. 
Based on the application of the developed concept of the economic and monetary poten-
tial, it is grounded that in the medium term the world is likely to be generally divided into (if 
you ignore the British pound and the Japanese yen) the unstable predominant areas of US dol-
lar (relatively stable), euro (decreasing), and RMB (increasing). The Russian ruble will re-
main on the world periphery and the potential growth of its influence will only be of a region-
al character. In general, the world will move to a multipolar financial architecture, the for-
mation of which is connected with the "warming up" of new hotbeds of financial strains. 
Nevertheless, the US dollar will still remain the world’s leading currency for a long 
time (at least until the 2030s), due to the high political, military and economic influence of the 
USA, the relatively balanced monetary flows sources, the orientation of the economy on the 
large internal market, rather than on volatile external markets, as well as taking into account 
the "path dependence", in this case – the benefits of using the US dollar from the minimizing 
transaction costs standpoint. 
The paper also substantiates, that in the medium-term agenda, despite the fact that  
the leading central banks managed to pacify the global crisis of 2007-2008, to improve  
the prospects for the developed economies and to begin the processes of normalizing  
the monetary policy, there remain the following questions of: distorted financial asset  
values and high risks in the non-financial sector, which is being restructured on cyber-
physical technologies; persistently low interest rates in many developed countries; overheated 
credit and securities markets; high levels of global and national debts; targeted use of national 
currencies in order to achieve unilateral trading advantages, new challenges, related to the re-
structuring of the financial intermediation sector under the influence of fintech, etc. This is 
exactly the modern "financial normality", under which turbulent processes of shaping the new 
political and economic structure of the world will take place in the forthcoming years.  
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Rather than declining, according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), global 
financial risks are only increasing in the 
medium term, which, combined with the 
transformation of the global industrial struc-
ture and aggravating political contradictions, 
makes countries and markets more vulne-
rable to external and internal shocks [1]. 
Moreover, the situation can be exacerbated 
in view of recent events involving accusa-
tions against a number of world’s leading 
countries of using their national currencies 
in order to achieve unilateral trade ad-
vantages [2]. 
The global financial instability must 
have become chronic. At first, during the 
Scandinavian banking crisis in the early 
1990s it was seen as an accident, later on 
during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
1998 it showed as a symptom, and finally it 
became a dangerous disease in time of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 in North 
America, that shortly developed into global 
recession. In terms of the slow global eco-
nomic growth (less than 3% in 2014-2016) 
the current outrunning of the credit growth 
in the US, EU and Japan, as well as in a 
number of developing countries, aimed at 
maintaining the consumer demand, can 
cause yet another financial turmoil at any 
time. According to the experts from McKin-
sey&Company, "Seven years after the burst-
ing of a global credit bubble resulted in the 
worst financial crisis since the Great De-
pression, debt continues to grow. In fact, 
rather than reducing indebtedness, or delev-
eraging, all major economies today have 
higher levels of borrowing relative to GDP 
than they did in 2007. Global debt in these 
years has grown by $57 trillion, raising the 
ratio of debt to GDP by 17 percentage 
points. That poses new risks to financial sta-
bility and may undermine global economic 
growth" [3]. 
It is becoming yet more obvious, that 
recurrent financial crises are not a random 
problem, emerged under unfortunate occur-
rences, but is the intrinsic property of the 
modern world at current stage of its devel-
opment.  
The root of this lies in the following 
fundamental factors of global instability: 
populational factor – limitations in human 
development with the growth of population 
and the depletion of natural resources, nec-
essary for its sustainable reproduction [4, p. 
45]; civilizational factor – an uneven global 
demographic dynamics, decreasing potential 
of Western civilization and increasing po-
tential of non-Western civilizations (the 
Chinese, Hindu, Islamic civilizations) [5, pp. 
46-60]; technological factor – a change of 
dominant technological modes with the 
transition to the production, based on the 
cyber-physical systems and blending of en-
abling technologies, blurring the boundaries 
between physical, digital and biological 
spheres [6]; allocative factor – shifting glob-
al production capacities to developing coun-
tries, which led to fundamental shifts in sav-
ings and investment [7, pp. xi-xii]; financial 
factor – rapid development of global finan-
cial markets and a dramatic increase in the 
mobility of international capital flows [4, 
pp. 46-47]. 
The abovementioned factors are, ob-
viously, of different time, field and power of 
influence, and their impact is ambiguous, 
but in a complex and taking into account the 
growing gap between global production 
growth rates and money supply, they form, 
as the experts note, such a situation of a 
"new normal" [8; 9], in which there is no 
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chance for the situation in the global finance 
to be alleviated in medium term [1]. 
In order to find possible solutions to 
this set of problems it is necessary to con-
tinue the special study of the new financial 
normality phenomenon, given the particular 
significance of the relationships in the real 
and monetary spheres. To this end, the paper 
presents the analysis of the origins, chal-
lenges and risks, associated with the global 
financial instability and the national curren-
cies struggle, aimed at improving the under-
standing of the changes, taking place in the 
global financial system in the face of new 
technological revolution. 
Over the recent years, despite the 
slowdown in the world GDP growth, the 
money supply and central governments 
debts have been increasing rapidly (Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
Fig.1 Comparative dynamics of the global economy, money supply growths  
and central government debt 
 
In reality, we should prepare for new 
manifestations of global financial instability, 
and to find appropriate responses to emerg-
ing circumstances of the world, regional 
(regions of the world), and national econo-
mies development. 
Cash and liquidity (highly liquid as-
sets) are, metaphorically speaking, the blood 
of the economic system. And like human 
blood examination helps to identify the dis-
ease correctly, an analysis of cash and those 
monetary arrangements of economic devel-
opment, applied by the world’s major play-
ers, is an important step on the way to the 
correct conclusion about the state of the is-
sue, the essence and ways of solving emerg-
ing problems in the global economy, where 
the civilizations clash, countries fight for 
power and limited resources, financial bub-
bles appear and collapse, sending the waves 
of financial instability all over the world. 
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Nowadays there are several influential 
centres, which generate cash and liquidity 
flows of different capacity and quality – 
these are the leading countries of the West 
and East, but in this paper we deal only with 
those, which, in our opinion, are of greater 
interest from the economic diagnostics 
standpoint. Those are the leaders of global 
West – the USA (the dollar area) and the EU 
(the euro area), global East – China (RMB 
area), and also the huge Eurasian country– 
Russia (the ruble area). 
Now the leaders of the global west – 
the US and the EU – are the centres of glob-
al capitalism as well as the world’s leading 
monetary centres. It is the West where main 
international financial institutions were es-
tablished, such as IMF and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD, the World Bank) [10]. According to 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Finan-
cial Telecommunications (SWIFT) the  
activity share of the US Dollar ($), which  
is the global most used currency, exceeded 
40%, and that of the Euro (€) account  
for about 30%, that is in total over 70%  
of global transactions (by costs). The main 
source of cash and liquidity of these  
economies is capital in the sense that the 
middle place in money-commodity-money 
(M-C-M) chain, which determines natural 
growth limits of the fiat money supply
1
, is 
mostly taken by capital-intensive products 
[11, p. 40]. 
                                                          
1
 On the one hand, it is important to empha-
size that there is no direct functional link between 
real and monetary variables, but, on the other hand, 
they cannot be considered independently. In philo-
sophical terms, there is more of an essential coordi-
nation between them, the indissociability, parameters 
of which vary depending on the circumstances, time 
and place, and path dependence. And, moreover, the 
great importance is given to the restrictions put on a 
relation sign, i.e. the apparent condition of sustaina-
ble economic systems development is such dynamics, 
in which the monetary variables growth is accompa-
nied by increasing (not decreasing) real variables. 
The leading country on the global 
East – China – is a rapidly developing mon-
etary centre, the growing power of which is 
based on its leadership in global production 
of material goods. The RMB (¥) activity 
share is relatively small and corresponds to 
nearly 2% (December 2016) and therefore 
takes the 6th place in the world. However, 
for example, in operating the documentary 
credit transactions, which are widely used in 
Asian trade financing, China has already 
taken the 2d place after the USA. The main 
Chinese source of cash and liquidity is la-
bour, because the middle place in M-C-M 
chain, which determines natural growth lim-
its of the money supply, is mostly taken by 
labour-intensive products [11, p. 40]. It’s 
not surprising, as long as China is the world 
labour force leader (more than 800 million 
people).  
And finally, Russia – the link between 
East and West – is a country of the size of a 
continent (over 17 billion square km) and 
has the largest territory on Earth. The Rus-
sian Ruble (₽) is not listed among the main 
currencies, as it operates less than 0.5% of 
world payments. Nevertheless, the Russian 
monetary arrangement analysis is of great 
interest, at least for two reasons.  
Firstly, the political and economic rea-
son, that is the growing global influence of 
Russia. The Russian Federation managed to 
recover after the USSR had collapsed, to 
save and upgrade the substantial military 
force, which is now ranked the second place 
globally [12]. Russia is among the top 5 of 
world emerging economies – the BRICS 
group, positioning itself as an alternative 
centre of power, including a monetary one
2
. 
And secondly, the natural resources: 
Russia is enormously rich in mineral re-
sources, especially in hydrocarbons – highly 
                                                          
2
 In July 2014 the BRICS countries signed the 
agreement for setting up the BRICS New Develop-
ment Bank, which was designed to be an alternative 
to the World Bank and the IMF [13]. 
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marketable goods of strategic importance 
for the modern economy. Thus, the main 
Russian source of cash and liquidity is natu-
ral resources, because the middle place in 
M-C-M chain, which determines natural 
growth limits of the money supply, is mostly 
taken by resource-intensive products [11, 
p. 40]. 
Traditionally, the largest part of Rus-
sian hydrocarbons export goes to the EU 
countries. Recently, however, things start to 
change. In May 2014, the Russian PJS Gaz-
prom and China National Petroleum Corpo-
ration (CNPC) have signed a 30-year con-
tract for supply of up to 38 billion m3 of the 
Russian gas to China per year. During the 
lifetime of this contract over 1 trillion m3 of 
gas is to be delivered to China which means 
to be the largest Gazprom deal [14]. Also, 
intense cooperation is developing in other 
areas.  
Given the vast resources of these 
countries, eventually new global coalition 
can challenge the global West, including 
monetary sphere. As noted by the USA ex-
perts, "the Russia-China Alliance – we call 
it the new Axis – is already extraordinary 
powerful, as it is evident not only from the 
new economic and trade agreements and 
military cooperation, but also from the 
spheres of nuclear proliferation and cyber 
warfare. Both together and separately Russia 
and China seek to undermine social, eco-
nomical and political foundations of the 
democratic societies and our unions in a 
way that is yet to be fully comprehended" 
[15]. However, China and the Russian Fed-
eration themselves believe, that their rela-
tions are at the best stage in the whole histo-
ry [16]. All this, in turn, has a profound and 
multilateral influence on the global econom-
ic processes in general and the trends in the 
new financial reality evolution in particular. 
In political and economic terms, the 
modern world, for many reasons, has be-
come multipolar, and now the United States 
and the West in general are not the world’s 
only centres of power. According to Patrick 
J. Buchanan
1
, "Toward the end of the presi-
dency of George H.W. Bush, America stood 
alone at the top of the world – the sole su-
perpower… Consider now the world our 
next president will inherit. North Korea, 
now a nuclear power ruled by a 30-
something megalomaniac, is fitting ballistic 
missiles with nuclear warheads. China has 
emerged as the great power in Asia, entered 
claims to all seas around her, and is building 
naval and air forces to bring an end to a U.S. 
dominance of the western Pacific dating to 
1945. Vladimir Putin is modernizing Rus-
sian missiles, sending ships and planes into 
NATO waters and air space, and supporting 
secessionists in Eastern Ukraine. The great 
work of Nixon and Reagan – to split China 
from Russia in the “Heartland” of Halford 
Mackinder's “World Island”, then to make 
partners of both – has been undone. China 
and Russia are closer to each other and more 
antagonistic toward us than at any time 
since the Cold War" [17]. 
However, as for the monetary system, 
it still remains western-polar, and seems to 
be stuck in the Bretton Woods system, the 
western rules-based world order – under-
pinned by the IMF and the World Bank, 
with the US dollar in its heart – that 
emerged after World War II and institution-
alized America’s geopolitical supremacy 
[18]. As already mentioned, the major west-
ern currencies – the US dollar and the euro – 
account for the majority of all international 
payments in the world (at cost). The US dol-
lar and the euro are the leading global re-
serve currencies – more than 80% of global 
foreign exchange reserve assets are denomi-
nated in them [19]. At the same time, ac-
                                                          
1
 Patrick Joseph Buchanan (born 1938) is the 
well-known American politician and political com-
mentator, worked as the special assistant to R. Nixon, 
as the adviser to G. Ford, and served as Reagan 
White House Communications Director. 
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cording to the World Bank, the combined 
share of the US and the EU engagements in 
industry, which is the engine of innovative 
development of the world economy, is now 
about 30%. 
Currently, this monetary world order 
does not work properly. According to 
J. Stiglitz, Nobel Memorial Prize laureate in 
Economics, "Right now, the world suffers 
from insufficient aggregate demand. Finan-
cial markets have proven unequal to the task 
of recycling savings from places where in-
comes exceed consumption to places where 
investment is needed. When being the 
Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben 
Bernanke mistakenly described the problem 
as a “global saving glut”. But in a world 
with such huge infrastructure needs, the 
problem is not a surplus of savings or a de-
ficiency of good investment opportunities. 
The problem is a financial system that has 
excelled at enabling market manipulation, 
speculation, and insider trading, but has 
failed at its core task: intermediating savings 
and investment on a global scale" [20]. 
To overcome the consequences of the 
global financial crisis, to maintain demand 
and to prevent deflation, the US monetary 
authorities (and then the EU and Japan) 
launched new innovative liquidity injection 
and the money cost reduction for their coun-
tries programme. At this time, the US Fed-
eral Reserve System’s extensive discretion-
ary actions expanded beyond merely con-
trolling the money stock, so this practically 
became "… a gigantic, financial central 
planner" [21, p. 486]. 
Such monetary policy, on the one part, 
allowed breaking the unfavourable econom-
ic trends: for instance, after the financial cri-
sis of 2007-2008 the USA started creating 
new jobs, reduced unemployment and raised 
consumption rate, investment, R&D spend-
ing [22]. According to the World Bank’s 
data, the average economic growth rates in 
the USA in 2010-2016 were over 2%. In 
2014 the EU countries (member states of 
euro area) also reached the positive growth 
rates. 
Yet, on the other part, it creates new 
challenges. 
The thing is that the value of money is 
information of fundamental importance for 
the market economy that regulates business 
processes, primarily – investments. The 
planned large-scale money depreciation 
leads to an artificial rise in the value of as-
sets (low interest rates increase the return on 
shares, corporate bonds, real estate and other 
assets, pushing the value), encourages en-
terprises into critical debts, reduces the bor-
rowers' quality and distorts economic data 
for investors. All this has long-term negative 
consequences and increases the possibility 
of other financial bubble occurrences. In 
such situation investment flows can be di-
rected to projects which normally would not 
be considered as attractive, or to dealing for 
stock prices and speculations. But industry 
sector with a moderate return for capital 
employed, which is a built-in innovation 
generator in the economy, wins little from 
this. Another reason for that is that financial 
capital, boosted by the quantitative and 
credit-easing policy, can choose where to 
invest, while avoiding excessively risky 
compared to the expected return invest-
ments, when production capital, which de-
pends on the previous path of development, 
has to seek for technical solutions and fi-
nancial resources within narrowly defined 
frames [23, p. 105]. 
It should also be taken into account, 
that monetary and other measures of over-
coming the recession, taken by the govern-
ments of many developed countries, ex-
hausted their supplies of anti-crisis policy 
tools, because the interest rates of the central 
banks are of nearly zero value, and the pub-
lic debt and budget deficits in many coun-
tries have not decreased, but increased, 
reaching the alarming proportions. As noted 
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in The Economist (2015 "The Bank of Eng-
land’s base rate sits at 0.5%. Records dating 
back to the 17th century show that, before 
2009, it had never fallen below 2%; and fu-
tures prices suggest that in early 2018 it will 
still be only around 1.5%. That is healthy 
compared with the euro area and Japan, 
where rates in 2018 are expected to remain 
stuck near zero. When central banks face 
their next recession, in other words, they 
risk having almost no room to boost their 
economies by cutting interest rates. That 
would make the next downturn even harder 
to escape" [24]. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize, 
that due to the peculiarities of the current 
monetary order such actions of the US Fed-
eral Reserve System have global impact: 
"Printing dollars at home means higher in-
flation in China, higher food prices in Egypt 
and stock bubbles in Brazil. Printing money 
means that U.S. debt is devalued so foreign 
creditors get paid back in cheaper dollars. 
The devaluation means higher unemploy-
ment in developing economies as their ex-
ports become more expensive for Ameri-
cans. The resulting inflation also means 
higher prices for inputs needed in develop-
ing economies like copper, corn, oil and 
wheat. Foreign countries have begun to fight 
back against U.S.-caused inflation through 
subsidies, tariffs and capital controls; the 
currency war is expanding fast" [25, p. 9]. 
In general, all this testifies to the fact, 
that globally the major financial intermedi-
aries appeared to be "short-sighted" and 
lacking professionalism. They learned well 
how to solve the current problems of mone-
tary regulation of national economies (from 
time to time puffing both local and global 
financial bubbles). Regarding the global real 
investment financing – in this respect the 
situation is much worse. This is point one.  
Point two is that in the existing world 
order the new world centres of political and 
economic power (above all China, the eco-
nomic and monetary potential
1
 of which is 
growing at a higher rate – Fig. 2) are limited 
in their international monetary power 
(Fig. 3). 
It appears that in this regard they are 
dependent on the external forces and the 
impacting external economic environment, 
and are unable to control the global situation 
in accordance to their increased potentials, 
but each time are forced to seek ways of 
calming the new emerging from the outside 
"tsunami waves" of financial and economic 
instability. 
                                                          
1
 Economic and monetary potential is an indi-
cator for characterizing the commodity-cash flow 
capacity of the country, a kind of working capital, 
which takes into account only the turnover. The latter 
varies in different countries, because along with the 
broad money it uses the GDP, resulting from the an-
nual money circulation. 
Therefore, the following formula is offered: 
0,5( ) ,i i iP GM  
where 
iG  is the GDP (the value of final goods pro-
duced and sold during the year) of the country i ;       
iM  is the broad money (M2), which served 
the production and sale of these products in the coun-
try i  over the year. 
International payments only use the 
ix  
part of 
the broad money, let it be called .xi i iM M x  Circu-
lating 
xiM  serves a certain amount of ik  of the total 
annual value W of the international payments sum of 
,xi i iM v Wk  
where 
iv  is the broad money circulation speed (cir-
cles number) in the country i.  
Then the realized potential, taking into ac-
count that the currency of the country serves only a 
part of international turnover, is accounted for 
0,5( ) ,i i iP GWk  and the comparative economic 
and monetary potential of the country a to the coun-
try b, considering different levels of international 
payments involvement is accounted for 
0,5 0,5
/
0,5 0,5
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .
a b a a b b
a a b b
P GWk GWk
G k G k


 
  
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Source: calculated on data from The World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
Fig.2. The absolute economic and monetary potential of different world monetary centres  
(the root of the GDP to M2) 
 
 
 
Source: calculated on data from The World Bank, World Development Indicators; SWIFT Annual Review. 
 
Fig.3. The comparative economic and monetary potential of different world monetary centres, 
having regard to the currencies’ participation in the international settlements 
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But the new world centres have been 
already disagreed with this global state of 
affairs and will hardly support it voluntarily 
in the future. Practically it means the cur-
rency competition. 
The example is the major world com-
modity-money "USA-China" link. 
In the globalized world the production 
capacities are mostly placed in countries 
with the lowest costs, trained labour force, 
access to raw materials and modern technol-
ogies (that is now the case in China). In 
these conditions, the policy of the leading 
global power centre, which is also the lead-
ing global liquidity centre (the US Federal 
Reserve System), imposes the constraints on 
the policies of all other power centres, and 
the consequences are often hard to predict. 
For example, the "helicopter drop of mon-
ey"
1
 that is the "quantitative easing", used 
by leading developed countries by repur-
chasing government obligations on the sec-
ondary market (from banks), and the "credit 
easing" by repurchasing at certain segments 
of markets the commercial papers, corporate 
bonds and asset-backed securities, may lead 
to bringing the inflation to its normal, con-
duce the reshoring and instigate the issuers’ 
performance, as well as to a deflation and 
further stagnation of country’s industry, on-
ly if mass production of commodities is 
stuck in offshore. 
The reasons why it can stay there are 
as follows: 
(1) Inertia. The relocation of produc-
tion is associated with the costly (including 
transactional costs) leaving of one produc-
tion location and entering the other. The 
productive capital "is basically tied to con-
crete products, both by installed equipment 
with specific operational capabilities and by 
linkages in network of suppliers, customers 
                                                          
1
 The metaphor by M. Friedman, characteriz-
ing the peculiar monetary policy of combating the 
deflation, which was used in one of his speeches by 
the former US Federal Reserve System’s chairman B. 
Bernanke, for which he was dubbed the Helicopter 
Ben [21]. 
or distributors in particular geographic loca-
tions" [23, p. 105]. So, taking the full costs 
into account, the relocation process is not so 
easy to implement, even if the task is set by 
politicians
2
; 
(2) Despite the increase in costs in the 
offshore, a safety margin in the form of 
lower wage costs (at global competitive 
prices for equipment, raw materials and 
their method of connection – technology) 
can be quite big. For example, the Chinese 
wages increase, even double, which howev-
er would not make it equal to the American 
level, but with the availability of low-wage 
labour force would create additional incen-
tives for all the new layers of workers in un-
productive areas, to involve in more produc-
tive and lucrative sphere of industrial manu-
facturing, thereby heating up the economy 
through investments in mass labour force 
relocation and allocation (which is the case 
in China, where only over 3 years (2011-
2013) more concrete on the new buildings 
had been spent, than in the United States 
over the whole 20
th
 century [27])
3
; 
                                                          
2
 The typical example is from the USA. In 
2012, during the meeting with the heads of the US 
leading technology companies, Barack Obama asked 
Steve Jobs, if it was possible to transfer the Apple 
production back to America. Jobs responded that it 
was impossible and those jobs would not be coming 
back ("Why can’t that work come home? Mr. Obama 
asked. Mr. Jobs’s reply was unambiguous. “Those 
jobs aren’t coming back,” he said"). The main reason 
for that is the modern USA infrastructure and labour 
force does not meet Apple’s needs, and this situation 
cannot be changed in a quick way [26]. 
3
 It should be noted, however, that China's ca-
pabilities in this regard also are limited. Countries, 
with most population living in rural areas, really can 
steadily develop their economies for years at the ex-
pense of the rural workers and low salary rate, as the 
Nobel Prize winner in economics – A. Lewis – sub-
stantiated in the mid-1950s. But China, according to 
some experts, is showing signs that the economic 
processes reached the so-called Lewis turning point, 
when the labour force sources are running short and 
wages are growing rapidly. At least in 2005-2010 the 
increase in the number of the migrant workers from 
the countryside was at 4%, while in 2014 it amounted 
to only 1.3% [28]. 
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(3) Compensating costs reduction on 
account of the scientific and technological 
advance: if technological order (techno-
economic paradigm) is in deployment 
phase in the country, then the enhance-
ments, hindering the imported inflationary 
costs growth, and/or significantly improv-
ing the quality of goods and services can be 
introduced with relatively low investments 
and a small-time lag. It should be borne in 
mind that the location of the generator of 
such innovations is turned towards the pro-
duction location: science is gradually 
drawn to the industry, which forms a sym-
biosis of research and production. It hap-
pened so in the early 20
th
 century, when  
the R&D moved from Europe to the for- 
mer "workshop of the world", the United 
States, and so it happens at the beginning 
of the 21
st
 century, when the R&D is  
gradually moving to the current "workshop 
of the world" – the East and South-East 
Asia. 
In such circumstances, the newly is-
sued currency goes into the hands of the 
sellers of offshore-originated products and 
through the adjustable floating RMB rates 
(which, according to the government, is of 
the China national interests) becomes the 
national currency injection, heating up its 
(China’s) economy. 
In order to sterilize the money inflows, 
keeping the inflation within normal range 
and preventing its conversion into an uncon-
trollable spiral, the offshore government can 
use three main options: 
(1) to hoard capital into international 
liquidity, usually presented in form of debt 
securities issued by foreign governments 
(especially the US Treasury securities) and 
in gold [29]; 
(2) to invest outside China in the pro-
jects of critical importance for the national 
security (the production and supply of raw 
materials, the creation of new transport cor-
ridors for incoming and outgoing goods 
flows, etc.
1
); 
(3) to invest money in the accelerated 
development of the national economy, in-
volving the production processes (including 
the production of export goods, which bring 
increased proceeds in the domestic curren-
cy), in new layers of human and physical 
resources, creating new production facilities 
and infrastructure for them. 
The results of these processes are as 
follows: 
  the inflation export from the country 
of issue to the offshore production country; 
  the inflationary heating-up of the 
offshore production, coming amid increas-
ing import expenditures, which usually op-
erates for the benefit of the competitive ad-
vantages of the issuing country; but, in the 
case of a particular set of circumstances (an 
X-case), the offshore production country 
may even reduce the product’s selling price, 
for example, due to excess investment in the 
production facilities and infrastructure 
(which had taken place in China in the af-
termath of the global financial crisis of 
2007–2008) and/or due to increasing inno-
                                                          
1
 For example, among such projects is the 
construction of the Nicaraguan Canal, about 300 km 
in length, the estimated cost of which is $50 billion. 
With this rival to the Panama Canal, Beijing expects 
to give a boost to the world shipping, which would 
stimulate the Chinese economic growth. The 5300-
km railroad through Brazilian and Peruvian Amazon 
is expected to be the next megaproject, financed by 
China. Another project is the "One Belt, One Road" 
which should connect 65 countries with a combined 
population of 4.4 billion people. The railway is ex-
pected to begin in Xian, the West of China, where the 
ancient Silk Road began, and passing through the 
whole Central Asia, the Middle East, Russia, ending 
in Western Europe. Rich in mineral resources and 
raw materials, Africa still remains in the sphere of 
China’s interest. For instance, in April 2015 the state-
owned China Railway Construction Corporation 
(CRCC) signed a $3.5 billion contract in Nigeria and 
a $1.9 billion in Zimbabwe, in addition to the $12 
billion contract to construct a railway through the 
state CRCC just signed in November 2014 [30]. 
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vation productivity through accelerated de-
velopment of the "production-science-
production’" symbiotic system; 
  growth of the public debt of the 
country of issue, that is, essentially, the 
transformation of central bank bills in the 
government bills, which are passed into the 
hands of external contractors, which get 
their hands on the levers of political and 
economic influence
1
; 
  an X-case – the offshore production 
country deflation export in form of new 
flows of bottom-of-the-line products, enter-
ing the country of issue [32; 33; 34]. 
Thus, in a globalized world an attempt 
to improve national finances in times of fi-
nancial crisis with ‘money helicopters’ can 
in the end result in some national economy 
warming-up, and/or in the paradoxical off-
shore production development, the growing 
welfare of those employed there and off-
shore economy as a whole; in the growing 
trade balance deficit of the country of issue, 
which consumes on account of public debt, 
to repay which it can become necessary to 
sell out fixed assets, or to default, or to lose 
political and economic power (which is the 
most likely option). 
It turns out that a lot of things critical-
ly depend not on money and monetary poli-
cy per se, but on the production location and 
the material development capabilities. But to 
let such production develop, it is first neces-
sary to have one. Figuratively speaking, to 
let a tree grow, expanding its living space, 
firstly it must be planted and "established". 
There is always a problem, and, in practice, 
very few manage to solve it. But China and 
some other countries of the East and South-
East Asia, still managed to do it. First, there 
                                                          
1
 Many economists believe that the US de-
pendence on foreign savings exposes the US econo-
my to certain risks, and some also claim that the 
cheap capital inflows contributed to the property 
market financial bubble and the subsequent global 
financial crisis, which began in 2008 [31]. 
appeared some free-trade zones in China, 
which grown up under a warm foreign in-
vestment "rain", which had fallen on the fer-
tile ground of stable political institutions, 
thousands year old Confucian traditions and 
cheap labour force, and which now are 
gradually transforming into "self-fertile" 
symbiotic systems of research and manufac-
ture:  by the volume of financing the Chi-
nese R&D is steadily catching up with the 
US R&D, surpassing all other countries of 
the world, and by the number of publica-
tions in scientific journals, China has al-
ready ranked second globally [35]. Alt-
hough, of course, in this regard, it is still far 
from being well and a lot of steps remain to 
be done: despite the growing financing, im-
proved training of scientific and technical 
personnel and modern scientific equipment, 
Chinese scientists have not yet succeeded in 
making Nobel Prize-worthy scientific break-
throughs, science and production remain 
disjointed and only a few research findings 
are brought to the level of innovative indus-
trial technologies and products, and Chinese 
enterprises, with few exceptions, are still 
heavily dependent on foreign sources of key 
technologies [36]. 
Anyway, current global money heli-
copter is mainly controlled by one pilot, and 
the pilot (the US Federal Reserve System) is 
obviously acting for the interests of a single 
country, above all, for the interests of the 
USA, thereby, creating challenges and prob-
lems for many other countries. So, there is a 
fundamental contradiction between new ris-
ing power centres, which are of great 
strength economically and monetarily, but 
still do not have global monetary authority, 
and previously-established centres of power, 
which use their global monetary authority in 
their own interests because of momentum 
(but not as effective as before). Therefore, 
for example, China does not want to sit 
soaking wet in the foreign monetary rains, 
and aims to give weigh to the national cur-
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rency (Yuan) in terms of global monetary 
system. The same also applies to other new 
centres of power. 
This paper investigates the current sit-
uation, problems and prospects of the devel-
opment of the world powerful monetary 
centres: the US with dollar, the EU with eu-
ro, China with Yuan and Russia with Ruble 
(though there still exist such traditional cen-
tres as the UK with Pound, Japan with Yen, 
as well as the developing Hindu, Muslim 
and Latin American countries). At the same 
time, as noted above, with a certain degree 
of conditionality we can claim that in the US 
and EU fiat liquidity flows mostly rely upon 
capital-intensive productions (capital), when 
in China – upon labour-intensive produc-
tions (labour), and in Russia – upon re-
source-intensive productions (natural re-
sources) [11, p. 40]. 
Every type of monetary flow in dy-
namics has its shortcomings: the capital-
relying one (industrial and financial) has 
problems, related to the possible financial 
capital separation from the material produc-
tion and the emergence of financial bubbles; 
the labour-relying one has problems, related 
to approaching the Lewis turning point; the 
natural-resource-relying one has problems, 
related to the prices volatility under techno-
logical advances and other factors.  
Obviously, to ensure greater stability 
and liquidity for fiat monetary flows it is 
better to rely on a balanced set of sources 
(the available internal or external), that al-
lows to overcome these problems easier and 
gives these flows the fundamental stability. 
In this respect, the USA are in the best 
position: generally, all three sources are 
available – capital, labour and natural re-
sources, although it is more of the financial 
capital (mainly equity-type of capital), than 
production capital, which, in fact, can result 
in financial bubbles and a weakening of 
confidence in US dollar and furthermore, 
the labour structure is gradually changed, 
bringing hard to predict, but likely negative 
consequences for the economy and mone-
tary flows. 
This is happening due to the dechris-
tianization processes in the US (as, however, 
and in the EU countries), the disintegration 
of society into conflicting ethnic, confes-
sional and other groups [37], the increasing 
number of Hispanic and Afro-American 
families, in the structure of the US popula-
tion, the median income of which is tradi-
tionally lower than that of white, non-
Hispanic families, and the higher unem-
ployment [38]. By 2050, current non-white 
minorities (any race other than non-
Hispanic, single-race Whites) will become 
the majority, and the proportion of the His-
panics can dramatically increase from the 
current 15% to 30% [39]. 
The situation is a little bit worse in 
China, which stands among the world lead-
ers in terms of labour force, many of which 
has sufficient knowledge and skills to partic-
ipate in the modern industry, and have 
amassed a capital powerful enough – both 
financial (as opposed to the US to a greater 
extent the bank capital, instead of the equity 
capital) and production, including many 
contemporary industrial technology, but are 
in relatively poor situation concerning its 
own natural resources. 
And the situation is even worse in the 
EU, the member states of which are tradi-
tionally in possession of a significant capi-
tal, capable of generating innovation, again 
mostly the financial capital (and, in contrast 
to the US, mainly bank-type) than produc-
tion capital, but have well known problems 
with natural and labour resources (including 
those related to the growing number of non-
assimilated Islamic population [40]), and 
especially Russia, which has abundant natu-
ral resources, but obviously has its chronic 
problems, both labour issues (difficult de-
mographic situation, the shortage of skilled 
engineering and working professionals), and 
capital  issues. 
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The EU-Russia and China-Russia alli-
ances are the speculative rivals to the US 
dollar. The first is unlikely to be realized in 
the current reality, including prevailing geo-
political trends and existing social and cul-
tural differences. The potential of the second 
alliance is growing, but it is also not clear 
yet how it will be implemented. Russia with 
its natural resources and central location in 
the Mackinder’s Heartland [41] is likely to 
maintain, if it is a success, good political 
relations and economic ties with both the 
West and the East. 
Nevertheless, the improving access 
even to the part of natural resources and the 
extending transportation and logistics, scien-
tific-technical and military cooperation with 
Russia [42] would stabilize Chinese econo-
my and the RMB a great deal, so that over 
time they will be able to challenge the cur-
rent monetary order. 
The steps in this direction have al-
ready been made, e.g. the construction of 
new oil and gas pipelines, the cooperation 
between two countries in the fields of space 
and aviation, the participation of Chinese 
capital in investing into the Russian Federa-
tion [16], newly created international banks 
(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the 
BRICS New Development Bank) with the 
participation of China, the Russian Federa-
tion, and others. 
However, it is clear, that all this is un-
likely to happen soon, especially since the 
USA and China are in the political and eco-
nomic clinch, when in the case China sells 
large amount of the US Treasury securities, 
owned by them, the cost of the remaining 
will decrease dramatically, and any negative 
shocks to the US economy will lead to a 
drop-in demand for Chinese exports, with 
all the resulting negative socio-economic 
and political consequences [31]. 
Given the evident undesirability of 
such shock transformations, in the next dec-
ade the US dollar is likely to have no serious 
rivals, although, the euro continues to weak-
en (due to the lag of EU economy growth 
rate behind the world rate, natural resources 
issues and the increasing demographic, eth-
nic and sectarian tensions), the weight of the 
Ruble in the future may expand gradually 
through the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU) potential realization and the expan-
sion of trade with China, but it will remain 
on global fringes, while RMB weight will 
continue to grow more quickly and in great-
er scale, provided that current trends (Fig. 2) 
last and China manages to maintain the po-
litical stability and to use natural resources 
and transit potential of other countries (in-
cluding Russia – through the new Silk Road 
Economic Belt, as well as the countries of 
Africa and Latin America), and as its pro-
duction capacity will be transformed into a 
strengthening of the monetary authorities in 
international economic relations. 
The Chinese monetary system is al-
ready becoming yet more and more global-
ized: more than 50% of non-Chinese com-
panies use RMB for payments outside great-
er China: in Singapore (74%); South Korea 
(59%); the euro zone (58%); the UK (57%), 
and North America (54%) [43, p. 7]. The 
companies, such as Daimler in Germany, 
Ford and General Motors in the US, have 
stated the RMB is now their second most-
used currency [44]. 
Moreover, in October 2016, the RMB 
was added to the IMF basket of reserve cur-
rencies, and its share in the Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) currency basket was 10,92% 
(this is the third position, the US dollar had 
about 40%, and the euro's share had de-
clined from 37,4% to 30,93%) [45].  
On the one hand, the inclusion of the 
RMB in the SDR basket secures the process 
of its internationalization and leads to a fur-
ther growth in demand for assets denomi-
nated in Chinese currency, from public and 
private investors. But on the other hand, all 
this is connected with the risks of impeding 
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control over the exchange rate of the RMB, 
increasing its value and capital outflows, 
with all the complex consequences arising 
for the Chinese and global economy. 
 
Conclusions 
In the upcoming decades, the world is 
likely to be generally divided into (if you 
ignore the British pound and the Japanese 
yen) the unstable predominant areas of US 
dollar (relatively stable), Euro (decreasing), 
and RMB (increasing). So, apparently, in 
the next few years, the RMB will not be dis-
placing the US dollar, but the US dollar and 
RMB will gradually replace the euro. The 
Russian rubble, as previously mentioned, 
will remain on the world periphery and the 
potential growth of its influence (including 
in connection with the predicted retention of 
Russia's positions in the top 10 of the 
world’s leading economies for the long term 
[46]) will only be of a regional character. 
US dollar will still remain the world’s 
leading currency for a long time (at least 
until the 30s of the 21
st
 century, to which the 
National Intelligence Council’s forecast ex-
tends [47]), due to the high political, mili-
tary and economic influence of the USA, the 
relatively balanced monetary flows’ sources, 
the orientation of the economy on large in-
ternal market, rather than on volatile exter-
nal markets, as well as taking into account 
the "path dependence" (in this case – the 
benefits of using the US dollar from the 
minimizing transaction costs standpoint
1
). 
The high US national debt undoubted-
ly creates great risks to the US economy, but 
in the relative weakness of the economies of 
                                                          
1
 The more popular one currency is, the more 
useful it is to those, holding it. And even if there is an 
incentive for someone to switch to the other less 
popular currency, they must first convince many oth-
er agents to switch to it before such a transition has a 
direct economic sense. These "switching costs" are 
one of the reasons why, for example, the pound is 
still widely used for international settlements, alt-
hough the United Kingdom has long lost its leading 
position in the world [48]. 
the euro zone and Japan, and strong demand 
for the reliable financial assets and the ac-
cumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
from the developing countries, this factor 
may play more to the maintenance of the US 
dollar leading role in the global financial 
system, than to its weakening.  
The sphere and strength of the euro in-
fluence will continue to decline as Europe 
does not have a balanced source of mone-
tary flows and is too weak politically and 
militarily, economically heterogeneous and 
institutionally divided to reliably attract 
them from outside and be effective at a 
global level. 
With regard to the prospects for Chi-
nese currency unit, striving for a fair repre-
sentation in the global financial system, the 
sphere and power of the RMB influence, 
despite the obvious growth contradictions 
and difficulties (associated with the exces-
sive debts of enterprises, large scale of 
shadow banking, stock market development, 
etc.), will increase
2
. Objectively, this is de-
termined by the fact that China is already 
the second world economy and consistently 
expands its access to new technologies and 
the world's natural resources, in addition to 
the existing human and financial resources, 
as through the creation of new global 
transport corridors. At the same time, the 
RMB rates of potential realization as a 
world currency will depend on the China’s 
successful policy in terms of the capital ac-
count liberalization, the greater exchange 
rate flexibility and financial market devel-
opment, and, of course, the country’s politi-
cal stability and the efficiency of the coun-
try’s economy. 
However, everything indicates that the 
world will not remain monetary West-polar, 
                                                          
2
 On the increasing role of RMB monetary 
power can be judged in how the Chinese decision to 
devaluate the RMB by several percent in August 
2015 caused considerable reaction in the world, re-
sulting in about $5 trillion loss for the global stock 
markets [49]. 
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and not purely due to monetary, but to the 
fundamental political and economic reasons, 
since Western Christian world gradually re-
treats under the increasing pressure from the 
renewing themselves East and South, the 
growing Confucian, Hindu and Muslim civi-
lizations. 
In this regard, taking into account the 
fundamental factors of global instability 
(populational, civilizational, technological, 
allocative and financial), it can be expected 
that in the long term the global financial sit-
uation on the planet will not become more 
stable. In the medium-term agenda, despite 
the fact that the leading central banks man-
aged to pacify the global crisis of 2007-
2008, to improve the prospects for the de-
veloped economies and to move to curtail-
ing the measures of the unconventional 
monetary policy (the US Federal Reserve) 
[50], there remain questions of: distorted 
financial asset values and high risks in the 
non-financial sector, which is being restruc-
tured on cyber-physical technologies; persis-
tently low interest rates in many developed 
countries; overheated credit and securities 
markets; high levels of global and national 
debts; targeted use of national currencies in 
order to achieve unilateral trading ad-
vantages, new challenges related to the re-
structuring of the financial intermediation 
sector under the influence of fintech, which 
requires further special studies, etc. This is 
exactly the modern "financial normality" 
under which turbulent processes of shaping 
the new political and economic structure of 
the world will take place in the upcoming 
years. 
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